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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

EAST VS. WEST—WHERE ARE ERRORS HARMLESS?
EVALUATING THE CURRENT HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE IN
THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS

“Errors are the insects in the world of law, travelling through it in
swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession. Many are plainly
harmless; some appear ominously harmful. Some, for all the benign
appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of followers that
deplete trials of fairness.
The well-being of the law encompasses a tolerance for harmless errors
adrift in an imperfect world. Its well-being must also encompass the capacity
to ward off the destroyers. So an inquiry into what makes an error harmless,
though one of philosophical tenor, is also an intensely practical inquiry into
the health and sanitation of the law.”
– Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor.

1

INTRODUCTION
When an appellate court finds error in a trial, it faces an inherently futile
challenge: to evaluate the effect of a hypothetical situation on a group of
persons the judges have never met and about whom they seldom have
information. Why, then, other than a court’s duty to preserve the parties’ right
to an equitable trial, does an appellate court attempt this challenge? The short
answer lies in the importance we place on the jury’s role in a trial. In the
United States, the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution cement
the jury trial’s inviolable presence in our justice system.2 This right to a trial
by jury forms one of the pillars on which the scales of justice are balanced.3

1. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR, at i (1970).
2. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII. These rights have been protected since their enactment in
1789. U.S. CONST. pmbl. amends. I–X.
3. The various statutes enacted to protect the Sixth and Seventh Amendments are like
branches of a tree; they incessantly reach into the chaos of justice, spreading the gospel of the
jury trial’s protection. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (2006) (preserving right to jury trial in nonbankruptcy actions); 48 U.S.C. § 1616 (2006) (extending right to jury trial to the Virgin Islands);
FED. R. CIV. P. 38 (preserving the right to jury trial in all civil claims).
1319
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Therefore, this fundamental right is given wide deference,4 and encroachment
upon it is met with an almost visceral reaction.5
The jury’s fundamental role in a trial creates difficulties with appellate
review of trial court error. Because we hold the jury’s participation in the
resolution of disputes in such high esteem, an appellate court must weigh the
effect a trial court’s error had on the jury or its verdict.6 If our justice system
did not hold the jury’s participation to be so inalienable, an appellate court’s
purpose could be a swift and simple affirmation of the facts and their
fulfillment of the burdens of proof, for there would be no danger of invading
the fact finder’s role.7 It is with this perspective—protecting the fact finder’s
autonomy—that a discussion of harmless error may begin.
The starting point in this discussion is a deceptively simple question: How
should an appellate court treat error at the trial level? There is a broad
spectrum of approaches courts may take. At one end stands a rigid protection
of the parties’ rights: an appellate court may decide that any error, from the
minutiae of evidence admission and exclusion to blatant violations of
constitutional rights, warrants reversal.8 This view, taken by both the early
courts in this country and the royal courts of early England, represents a rigid
adherence to the principle of blind equity and the sanctity of the jury’s role in
deciding disputes.9 In sharp contrast is a concern for efficiency and
practicality; an appellate court may decide that only egregious constitutional
violations or errors that clearly influence the jury should be disturbed.10 This
deferential view recognizes the difficulty in evaluating an error’s impact on a
proceeding, and that, while perfection should always be sought, it is rarely

4. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959) (holding that
when claims are both legal and equitable, the legal claims almost always should be heard in front
of a jury first).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511, 522–23 (1995) (rejecting the
government’s argument against defendant’s right to jury trial).
6. Theoretically, bench trials have the same difficulties. Harmless error analysis still
compels an appellate court to decide an error’s effect on the fact finder. So, for brevity and
clarity, although I generally refer to a “jury,” all triers-of-fact, be it an administrative hearing, a
bench trial, or a traditional jury trial, are subject to the same protections.
7. The jury was not always as important as we hold it today. Some of our founding fathers
questioned the role of the jury trial in an efficient system of justice administration. See, e.g.,
Alexander Hamilton, No. 83: The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury, in
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 494, 503–06
(Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 2003).
8. Violations of constitutional rights are usually thought of in relation to criminal trials;
however, there are constitutional rights protecting civil litigants as well. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend. VII (right to jury trial in civil context).
9. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional
Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2032–34 (2008).
10. See id. at 2035–37.
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obtained.11 Evaluations of trial error are necessary in this quest for equitable
perfection, but expend significant judicial resources.12 The difficulty in
reaching conclusions may render suspect the justification behind consuming
these resources.
The standard to be used for criminal constitutional violations has been
resolved,13 and will not be addressed in this Note. However, the federal
circuits have developed their own standards for judging non-constitutional
error in civil trials.14 It is not surprising that they have struggled with the
determination. No less than four statutes attempt to define harmless error
analysis:15 two Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,16 a Federal Rule of
Evidence,17 and a statute in the United States Code.18 However, very few
cases from the Supreme Court offer definitive guidance on how to apply

11. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
12. Determinations require both appellate resources in trying to judge an error’s harm as
well as trial court resources when error is found to be harmful and the case remanded.
13. The Supreme Court resolved the standard to be used in constitutional violations in
Chapman v. California, stating that a constitutional error is harmless when it appears “beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
14. Lacking unequivocal and decisive interpretation from the Supreme Court for nonconstitutional errors, the circuits have developed several standards. Sometimes the circuits have
even disagreed with one another or overruled their own precedent. For example, with respect to
criminal proceedings, the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have all, at one time or
another, used a “fair assurance” standard. See United States v. Ivezaj, 568 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir.
2009); United States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399, 402 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Bernal, 814
F.2d 175, 184–85 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Nyman, 649 F.2d 208, 211–12 (4th Cir. 1980).
However, the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have also used a higher standard, the “very slight
effect” standard. See United States v. Sands, 899 F.2d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 588 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 783 (7th
Cir. 1984). This Note will focus on the Third and Ninth Circuits.
15. The prevalence of various rules in differing codes suggests that lawmakers have also
struggled to define harmless error analysis.
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (“At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors
and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 (“Any error,
defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
17. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . . .”).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006) (“On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case,
the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).
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them.19 All four statutes seek to preserve trial court judgments despite error if
that error does not affect a “substantial right” of the parties.20
The standards used by the Third and Ninth Circuits in their application of
the harmless error statutes provide a good example of the chaos rampant
among the federal circuits.21 The Third Circuit finds non-constitutional error
harmless when it is “highly probable” that the error did not contribute to the
judgment.22 The Ninth Circuit uses a facially less stringent standard,
upholding a decision when the court can say with “fair assurance,” or if it is
“more probable than not,” that the error did not have a substantially injurious
effect.23
This Note examines the development and rationale for the Third and Ninth
Circuits’ divergent approaches to the harmless error doctrine. The goal is to
determine which circuit has come to the better conclusion.24 To reach this
goal, this Note will first briefly consider the development of this doctrine and
its subsequent adoption and development by the Third and Ninth Circuits.
Next, the tests used by each circuit will be compared to ascertain whether they
reach different results. Following this, the proper standard for implementing
harmless error review will be discussed. Finally, a new test for resolving the
issues presented by the competing values framing harmless error analysis will
be proposed. The test will balance the equity of litigants with concerns of
judicial economy.
This analysis suggests several conclusions. First, both circuits are correct
in trying to determine whether the error affected the verdict as rendered by the
19. The case cited frequently in the Supreme Court’s most recent jurisprudence is Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), for its guidance. See, e.g., Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112,
116–17 (2007). The more recent cases have been more specific applications, leaving the question
of general harmless error analysis dangerously open for interpretation.
20. See supra notes 16–18.
21. The Third and Ninth Circuits were chosen for two reasons. First, both the Third and
Ninth Circuits are large enough to have a robust line of cases that shows a clear adherence to one
consistent standard. Second, the standards are different, but well-defined.
22. McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924–25 (3d Cir. 1985).
23. United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir. 1992). Hitt also points out that, at that
time, there was a split within the Ninth Circuit over the standard to be applied. Id. As will be
explained infra, the Ninth Circuit has reconsidered the different tests and decided they are
expressions of the same standard. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. The two circuits
use their respective test for both criminal and civil proceedings, albeit for different reasons. See
infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (explaining that the Third Circuit applies its harmless
error test in both civil and criminal trials in order to avoid distorting the already-imbalanced
burdens of proof); see also infra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that in 1993, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the tests it had previously applied in criminal and civil cases express
the same standard).
24. “Correct” might seem more prefereable than “better,” but the question of which standard
to use in which situation is trying enough that a definitive conclusion still eludes even the
Supreme Court.
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fact finder. Second, the Ninth Circuit’s “fair assurance” test most efficiently
balances the concerns competing to create a workable standard.25 Third, the
Supreme Court’s somewhat ambiguous guidance, as well as the nature of
harmless error analysis, shows that some consideration of the amount of
evidence for or against a party is appropriate and perhaps unavoidable.26 The
proposed test attempts to resolve some of this ambiguity by preserving the fact
finder’s role in trial judgments while still allowing appellate courts to consider
evidence offered against a party.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE
A.

A Brief Background of American Harmless Error Jurisprudence

The harmless error doctrine has been hotly debated numerous times, both
in general27 and considering its specific applications.28 According to the
Honorable Chief Justice Roger Traynor’s29 seminal essay on the development,
rationale, and correct implementation of the doctrine of harmless error, the
doctrine has its roots in the misapplication of the English case Crease v.
Barrett, decided in 1835.30 Barrett was a reaction to previous decisions
holding that verdicts should be sustained if the courts were satisfied that the
evidence supported the verdict and the jury had reached the correct result.31

25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. E.g., Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism:
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1994) (arguing against the
“overwhelming evidence” test of appellate review of the harmfulness of errors); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 988–89 (1973) (discussing the
development and proper application of the harmless error doctrine).
28. E.g., Daniel J. Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121,
122 (1976) (proposing a theory for determining the level of harm using statistical and
probabilistic methods); Erika Plumlee, Comment, “To Err is Human” — But is it Harmless?:
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 81(b)(2) and the Court of Criminal Appeals’ Effort to
Fashion a Workable Standard of Review, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 2205, 2205 (1990) (discussing
the doctrine’s applications to the Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure).
29. The story of Chief Justice Traynor’s appointment to the California Supreme Court by
California Governor Culbert Olson is entertaining. While Chief Justice Traynor taught at
Berkeley, Governor Olson nominated an outspoken liberal colleague, much to the chagrin of then
California State Attorney General Earl Warren. See G. Edward White, Tribute, Roger Traynor,
69 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1382 (1983). Warren had the candidate’s nomination blocked, denouncing
his inexperience. See id. Governor Olson, wanting to expose Warren’s political motives,
nominated similarly inexperienced Chief Justice Traynor, who, though liberal, was less outspoken
about it. See id. He quietly ascended to the court with no protest from Warren. See id. For an
illuminating look at Chief Justice Traynor’s professional career and nomination to the California
Supreme Court, see generally id. at 81–86.
30. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 4.
31. Id. at 7–8.
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Barrett effectively discarded these previous decisions, noting that appellate
courts would be invading “the province of the jury.”32 Following this line of
thinking, both English and American courts were loath to invade the sanctity of
the jury’s role as the community’s voice and repeatedly declined to hold that
an error was harmless if it could not be said with certainty that the error had no
effect on the jury.33 This reasoning led the appellate courts in both countries to
vacate judgments at the slightest hint of error.34 Such treatment not only
reduced trials to an exercise in assuring that error was preserved in the record,
but also relieved the appellate courts of their responsibility to fully consider
both parties’ contentions.35 Thus, the mechanical treatment by the appellate
courts gave birth to the first harmless error statutes attempting to prevent this
automatic voiding of verdicts.36
This concern about mechanical overturning of jury decisions was espoused
most poignantly in 1946 by the Supreme Court decision of Kotteakos v. United
States.37 Kotteakos considered the application of conspiracy to money
laundering,38 but its focus was on the appellate court’s affirmation of the trial
judgment because the evidence indicated guilt was “manifest.”39 It used the
opportunity to give guidance on harmless error analysis.40 The Supreme Court
stressed the need for sound judgment to avoid loopholes that would allow
“correct” outcomes to stand, but also prevent trials from being “impregnable
citadels of technicality” whose errors are reversed mechanically.41 In this
respect, it agreed with the appellate court’s attempt to avoid a “miscarriage of
justice.”42 To combat the difficulty of balancing these competing forces,

32. Id. at 8.
33. Id. at 8–9, 13.
34. Id. at 9, 13.
35. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 14.
36. Id. The current harmless error statutes are codified in three places. In the Federal Code,
the statute governing harmless error is codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006). In the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, it is contained in Rule 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 61. The Federal Rules of Evidence
codified a harmless error statute in Rule 103(a). FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
37. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 758–62 (1946).
38. Id. at 753–55.
39. Id. at 755.
40. See id. at 758–77.
41. Id. at 759–60. Kotteakos remains an integral part of the Supreme Court’s harmless error
jurisprudence. Several of the Court’s more important and recent harmless error cases cite
Kotteakos extensively. See, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, No. 07–1209, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Apr. 21,
2009); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993); McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v.
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 49 (1967) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
42. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755, 758–59.
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Congress handed down a simple harmless error statute.43 According to the
Court, this statute (and by implication the subsequent statutes) has a
deceptively simple command: “Do not be technical, where technicality does
not really hurt the party whose rights in the trial and in its outcome the
technicality affects.”44
In resolving how to best preserve the statute’s command, the Court set out
several considerations as guidance to appellate courts in resolving the harmless
error question.45 The Court noted that “[s]ome aids to right judgment may be
stated more safely in negative than in affirmative form.”46 Because of the
difficulty in defining a standard, the Court told appellate justices what not to
do.47 “[I]t is not the appellate court’s function to determine guilt or
innocence.”48 The proper determination asks “not were they right in their
judgment . . . [but] what effect the error had . . . upon the jury’s decision.”49
With this in mind, the Kotteakos Court expounded its cherished rule: “if one
cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened . . . that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to
conclude that substantial rights were not affected.”50 The Court was urging
full and thoughtful contemplation on the trial as a whole, not based on rules or
considering the evidence offered in isolation.51 The “fair assurance” language
is the most cited of the opinion,52 and with it, the Supreme Court adopted the
“effect on the jury”53 test in determining what errors affect a party’s
“substantial rights.”54

43. At the time, it was codified as 28 U.S.C. § 391 (1940). None of the current statutes
existed in its current form when Kotteakos was decided in 1946, but they all retain the basic
principle of that era’s harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 391, which provides that error is not
harmful if it does not affect the “substantial rights” of the wronged party. See supra notes 16–18.
44. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760.
45. See id. at 761–64.
46. Id. at 763.
47. Id. at 763–64.
48. Id. at 763.
49. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764.
50. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 764–65.
52. According to Westlaw’s KeyCite feature, this language has been cited more than 2,250
times.
53. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
54. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. The Court went beyond simply deciding how to evaluate an
error’s prejudice to a party; it also left clues as to which standards courts were to use in their
analysis. Indeed, Kotteakos has been responsible for no less than three separate tests: the “highly
probable” test, the “fair assurance” test, and the “grave doubt” test. See id. at 765, 776. The
circuits have varied widely in their adoption of the language, moving between these three tests, as
well as others. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399, 402 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing United
States v. Hernandez-Burmudez, 857 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1988) (“highly probable” test)); United
States v. Tyler, 943 F.2d 420, 423 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (“grave
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The Kotteakos “effect on the jury” test requires an appellate court to
consider how the error could have swayed the jury in its deliberation and
decision.55 At its heart, this test considers the totality of the record, minus the
error, and attempts to determine whether the error could have influenced the
jury in reaching its verdict.56 In employing this test, a court must eschew
evaluation of the evidence for fear of stepping on the jury’s all-important
toes.57 As articulated by Chief Justice Traynor, the “effect on the jury” test
demands a standard by which an appellate court should find its conscience
clear in affirming a verdict, despite error.58
This standard is where courts differ in their harmless error analyses.59 The
reasons for deciding on a particular standard aside,60 there are three relevant
standards used by the Third and Ninth Circuits to determine an error’s effect
on the jury.61 They diverge in a fashion similar to differing burdens of proof.
The standards require appellate courts to consider the probability, or the degree

doubt” test)); United States v. Sands, 899 F.2d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that an
appellate court must be able to say “with reasonable certainty that the [error] had but very slight
effect”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Weger, 709 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.
1983) (“more probable than not” test).
55. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764–65. Kotteakos is not the only case that focuses the analysis
of harmless error on the effect of the error on the jury or its verdict. In Chapman v. California the
Court noted that harmless error statutes protect against reversal based on “small errors or defects
that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial[;]” rather, reversal
should be reserved for cases where, if jurors were to consider the cases produced at trial without
error, “honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts.” 386 U.S.
18, 22, 26 (1967) (emphasis added).
56. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765.
57. Id. at 764.
58. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 34–35. Indeed, as we will see, this is where the split
between the Third and Ninth Circuits lays.
59. Different harmless error standards are used by the federal circuits not only in their split
in evaluation of the “effect on the jury” test, but also in their treatment of harmless error in other
situations; for example, harmless error analysis is used when deciding if a constitutional error is
“structural” in nature and requires automatic reversal. See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S.
212, 218–19 (2006) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)); Chapman, 386 U.S.
at 23–24.
60. Professor Saltzburg has argued that the standard of measuring the harm of an error
should correspond to the action’s burden of proof. See Saltzburg, supra note 27, at 989. This
method, presumably, could cover every standard used in common practice: beyond a reasonable
doubt, clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence, even reasonable suspicion
and probable cause. This Note will not address this debate because neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress has mandated such an analysis based on the burden of proof. However, it is worth
noting that the “effect on the jury” test asks if error has influenced the jury’s deliberation in some
way. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764. If the question is whether the error was included in the
jury’s mental deliberations, assuming they were properly instructed on their burden of proof, then
this question necessarily includes the burden of proof.
61. See infra notes 62–63, 66 and accompanying text.
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of certainty, with which appellate judges can say that the error affected the
minds of the jury.62 The two standards used in the Ninth Circuit’s
development of the harmless error doctrine are the “fair assurance” standard
and the “more probable than not” standard.63 The “fair assurance” standard
allows a court to affirm a verdict when it can say with “fair assurance” that the
error was harmless.64 The “more probable than not” standard allows an
appellate court to affirm a verdict if it finds that it is “more probable than not”
that the error did not have an effect on the jury’s verdict.65 This suggests that
the “more probable than not” test is roughly equivalent to fifty-one percent
certainty that the error did not affect the verdict. The Third Circuit, however,
will affirm if it is “highly probable” that the error did not affect the jury.66
This standard seems to be higher on its face than both the “more probable than
not” and “fair assurance” standards.
Kotteakos contrasts the correct “effect on the jury” test with a different, but
ultimately impermissible, determination.67 Instead of considering the effect of
error on the minds of the jury, a court could also weigh the amount and degree
of evidence against a party to determine if it reaches the correct result.68 In
contrast to the “effect on the jury” test of harmless error, this alternative test
allows what the previous one does not: evaluation of the evidence against a
party in the determination of whether error is harmful.69 This test concedes
that “in equating a correct result with justice, an appellate court necessarily
envisages what result it would have reached as a trier of fact, thereby
substituting itself for the actual trial court or jury.”70 The rationale behind this
test is that if the verdict, given the overwhelming evidence against a party, is
clearly correct, it should not be disturbed unless an egregious error has
occurred.71 Kotteakos cautions against such determinations being the sole
criteria used to evaluate error because “[t]hose judgments are exclusively for
the jury.”72

62. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 33–37.
63. United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir. 1992).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lincow, 715 F. Supp. 2d 617, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
67. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
68. Id. at 763–64.
69. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 18–19.
70. Id. at 18. Per the reasons discussed in the Introduction, supra, this test is met with
resistance by Chief Justice Traynor. See id. at 18–22.
71. See id. at 22 (criticizing this test even where there is overwhelming evidence supporting
the verdict).
72. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 763. Notice that the jury’s importance to our judicial system is at
the heart of such a determination.
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Other opponents of this test, like Chief Justice Traynor, argue not just that
an appellate court cannot replace the jury, but that the right to a fair trial free of
harmful error is fundamental.73 This fundamental right, says Traynor, is more
than just a right to a “correct” verdict; it is a right to a fair process, to
“objective consideration of all proper evidence by triers of fact without
violations of any substantial rights . . . .”74 The “overwhelming evidence” test,
unlike the “effect on the judgment” test, does not beg for a standard of
The standard, presumably, is inherent in its verbiage:
assurance.75
“overwhelming.”
The Third and Ninth Circuits, as well as the other federal circuits, have
held to the “effect on the jury” test, or some similar iteration, in both the civil
and criminal context76 because both circuits were heavily influenced by
Kotteakos.77 However, as we will see, despite Kotteakos’s prohibition on
appellate consideration of the evidence in isolation, the “effect on the jury” test
has been incorrectly applied at times, and appellate courts have weighed the
evidence under the guise of the “effect on the jury” test.78 The following is an
examination of the development of this doctrine and the standards to be
applied for the “effect on the jury” test in both the Third and Ninth Circuits.
B.

The Third Circuit’s Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule

The Third Circuit’s journey through the doctrine of harmless error begins,
ironically, with a 1983 Ninth Circuit decision, Haddad v. Lockheed California
Corp.79 Haddad has two important holdings.80 First, Haddad rejected prior

73. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 19–20.
74. Id. at 20.
75. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (applying the overwhelming
evidence test, while at the same time cautioning against its use in general for constitutional errors,
because the evidence was so clear and overwhelming in the case being reviewed).
76. See Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying the “effect on
the jury” test in a criminal context); Rosa v. City of Chester, Pa., 278 F.2d 876, 881 (3d Cir.
1960) (applying the “effect on the jury” test in a civil context). It is unclear whether the Ninth
Circuit recognizes a distinction. In Mockler v. Multnomah County, a civil case, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the “harmless error standard used in a civil case is less stringent than that used in a
criminal case.” Mockler v. Multnomah Cnty., 140 F.3d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting City of
Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 46 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 1995)). Subsequent Ninth Circuit
civil cases have not used such language in conjunction with citing the harmless error test. See,
e.g., Geurin v. Winston Indus., Inc., 316 F.3d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 2002); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180
F.3d 997, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999).
77. See infra Part I.B–C. There are a few exceptions to this rule, but they have mostly fallen
into disfavor. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1237–38 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding
the trial court’s “otherwise reversible [jury instruction] error” was harmless due to overwhelming
evidence of defendant’s guilt); Bates v. Nelson, 485 F.2d 90, 94 (9th Cir. 1973).
78. See, e.g., Simon, 995 F.2d at 1247; Bates, 485 F.2d at 94.
79. Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Ninth Circuit application of the “highly probable” and “more probable than
not” standards based on the right on which the error infringes: specifically,
whether that right is constitutional in nature.81 It reasoned that such a rigid
distinction allows courts to circumvent their duty to ensure a fair and correct
result, “avoid[ing] relying on the distinction by finding harmlessness under all
standards.”82 Ninth Circuit panels were finding errors harmless under both
standards before reaching the more difficult question of constitutionality, thus
negating harmless error analysis altogether.83
Presumably, the Ninth Circuit in Haddad found this analysis to be
unacceptable in both rationale and result.84 This facial distinction accords too
much deference to constitutional errors and ignores the fairness and analysis
that litigants deserve when appealing a non-constitutional error.85 The Ninth
Circuit implies that this ignorance has created an imbalance in judging error,
finding too many errors harmless.86 Thus, similar to the concerns that sparked
the enactment of the harmless error statutes, the Ninth Circuit declined to apply
the previous doctrine (which focused on the constitutional nature of the error)
because its automatic rules deprive the parties of a full and careful analysis of
the error’s impact on the trial.87
Having rejected the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional errors, the Haddad court looked to the nature of the harmless
error doctrine to decide the standard by which to judge an error’s impact on the
trial.88 The doctrine’s purpose, according to the Ninth Circuit, is to “gauge the
probability that the trier of fact was affected by the error.”89 It concluded that
this purpose requires distinct standards based on the burden of proof required
in the trial.90 The Court thus concluded that in civil actions, appellate courts
need only consider whether an error “more probably than not” affects the
verdict.91
Two years later, in McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., the Third Circuit
took direct issue with the Haddad court’s rationale for splitting the standard
80. See id. at 1457–59.
81. Id. at 1457–58. Prior cases in the Ninth Circuit had framed the question based solely on
whether the error was constitutional or non-constitutional. Id.
82. Id. at 1458.
83. Id. at 1458 n.5.
84. See Haddad, 720 F.2d at 1458.
85. Id. at 1457–58.
86. Id. at 1485 n.5.
87. Id. at 1457–59.
88. Id. at 1458–59.
89. Haddad, 720 F.2d at 1458–59.
90. Id. at 1459.
91. Id. It is important to note that Haddad quotes Kotteakos heavily as authority supporting
its propositions. See id. As we have seen, however, this distinction between criminal and civil
cases was not Kotteakos’s intent. See supra Part I.A.
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between criminal and civil trials.92 It reasoned that jury verdicts in civil cases
demand respect and tolerance for error equal to that of criminal cases, citing
some significant consequences civil cases may have, such as large awards of
damages and civil rights ramifications.93 Further, society’s tolerance for error
in civil cases is “subsumed in . . . [the] lower burden of proof in civil cases,”
and a less stringent standard of harm will only enlarge this margin, distorting
this rationale’s objective.94 Thus, in McQueeney, the Third Circuit declined to
match the standard used to judge the harmfulness of the error with the burden
of proof at trial.95
The court then needed to decide the standard it would use. Using language
of balance and sound judgment reminiscent of Kotteakos, the court noted that
the goal of harmless error analysis requires:
[r]espect for the dignity of the individual, as well as for the law and the courts
that administer it . . . . [This respect] may call for rectification of errors not
visibly affecting the accuracy of the judicial process. And the prophylactic
effect of a reversal occasionally might outweigh the expenditure of effort on a
96
new trial.

This language echoes Kotteakos’s guidance: temperance and sound judgment
to ensure fairness to the parties and the court.97 The court in McQueeney
concluded that adopting a similarly balanced standard best preserves these
competing values.98 To the Third Circuit, the “highly probable” standard of
harmlessness is the appropriate standard.99
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule
The Ninth Circuit’s development of the harmless error doctrine began with
the premise in Haddad that the Third Circuit summarily rejected: that the
standard for judging an error’s harm should be bifurcated between civil and
criminal trials.100 This idea was a reaction to previous Ninth Circuit holdings
that differentiated only between constitutional and non-constitutional errors.101

92. McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 926 (3rd Cir. 1985).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 927.
96. Id. (quoting United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 512–13 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robinson,
J., dissenting)).
97. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762–65 (1946).
98. McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 927. This rationale will be of critical importance while trying
to discern the appropriate test for the circuits to utilize.
99. Id. at 927–28.
100. Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1983).
101. Id. at 1457.
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To the Ninth Circuit, this division was of less practical importance than the
distinction between criminal and civil actions.102
Having done away with the constitutional distinction,103 the Haddad court
decided that the proper standard should reflect the different burdens of proof in
civil and criminal cases.104 Paradoxically, the Ninth Circuit in Haddad cites
Kotteakos as authority for this distinction.105 As we have seen, Kotteakos
stands more for the premise that appellate courts must examine the error’s
effect on the jury, not for bifurcating standards between civil and criminal
cases.106 Haddad, correctly citing both Kotteakos and Justice Traynor, reasons
that appellate courts, when determining an error’s harm, stand in the dangerous
position of usurping the jury’s function.107 It then disregards the logic
underlying Judge Traynor’s central premise and continues with its criminalcivil distinction with a twofold argument: first, the danger of usurping the
jury’s function “has less practical importance . . . in . . . civil cases;”108 second,
there are “differing degrees of certainty owed to civil and criminal litigants”
and “[t]he civil litigant’s lessened entitlement to veracity” continues in the
appeal stage.109 The court then adopted the “more probably than not harmless”
test in civil cases, matching it with the civil burden of proof.110 This idea flies
in the face of both Traynor’s and Kotteakos’s logic,111 both of which the
Haddad court cited in immediately preceding sentences.112
The most fascinating aspect of the Haddad opinion is not its misguided
reasoning and ambiguous citations to authority, but that it came to the same
result as Kotteakos.113 Despite Haddad’s presumption of a necessary
distinction between civil and criminal cases, the Ninth Circuit adopted a “fair
assurance” test for criminal cases as well.114 In United States v. Hitt, the Ninth

102. Id. at 1457–59.
103. Id. at 1457.
104. Id. at 1458–59.
105. Haddad, 720 F.2d at 1459.
106. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text.
107. Haddad, 720 F.2d at 1459.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Professor Saltzburg agrees with this distinction and argues it forcefully. Saltzburg,
supra note 27, at 989.
111. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765; TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 25.
112. Haddad, 720 F.2d at 1459.
113. Compare United States v. Felix-Jerez, 667 F.2d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982), with
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. The Riddle of Harmless Error rears its head again: should we
consider the Haddad court’s error in rationale in reaching its conclusion, or accept that it came to
the “correct” result argued in Kotteakos?
114. That is, a Ninth Circuit appellate court can affirm only if there is a “fair assurance” that
the error was harmless, which is the same test handed down in Kotteakos. See, e.g., United States
v. Webbe, 755 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985); Felix-Jerez, 667 F.2d at 1304.
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Circuit discovered a split within the circuit at the time it was decided in 1992,
with some courts using the “fair assurance” test, while others used a different
test, reversing if an error is more probably than not harmless.115 It is unclear
whether the split mentioned was considered by the Hitt court to be exclusive to
criminal cases, or applied to both criminal and civil cases.116 However, at the
time, civil cases were resolved using the “more probable than not” test.117
How are these two tests, Haddad’s “more probable than not” test and
Kotteakos’s “fair assurance” test, reconciled in the Ninth Circuit? A
subsequent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Brooke, decided less than a
year after Hitt, pointed out the split within the circuit and determined that the
Thus, the Haddad court’s
two standards are one and the same.118
misapplication of Kotteakos and Chief Justice Traynor’s rules were harmless,
as the Ninth Circuit eventually reached the result handed down in Kotteakos:
that courts should decide the question using the “fair assurance” standard.119
D. Reconciling the Tests Used by the Two Circuits
Before beginning a comparison of the tests, it is worth noting at the outset
that the circuits have sometimes not reached the question the harmless error
statutes demand.120 Some courts, in applying rules and statutes, simply decide
that a failure to abide by them is reversible error without consideration of the
prejudice of the parties.121 Other courts have formulated their own specific
rules governing how to resolve specific errors.122 A trial judge’s expression of
opinion on an ultimate issue of fact in front of the jury will also be reversed as
prejudicial without regard to harmless error analysis.123 Evidentiary and jury

115. United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir. 1992).
116. See id.
117. Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 888 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Geurin
v. Winston Indus., Inc., 316 F.3d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 2002). Pau also noted inconsistent treatment
of the Haddad “more probable than not” standard in the civil arena. Pau, 928 F.2d at 888. This
is a testament to the confusion rampant through the federal circuits as a result of the Supreme
Court’s refusal to create a workable standard for non-constitutional errors.
118. United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Crosby, 75 F.3d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir. 1996). More recently, the Ninth Circuit uses both phrases
in its test. See United States v. 87.98 Acres of Land More or Less, 530 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir.
2008).
119. Brooke, 4 F.3d at 1488.
120. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 139–140 (3d Cir.
2009) (overturning sanctions against counsel for trial judge’s failure to consider the standard with
which a certification can be made to excuse a violation of FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)).
122. See, e.g., Barry v. Bergen Cnty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (setting
out a specific three-element test for examining the effect on a verdict of impermissible publicity
of a trial).
123. See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indon., 871 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1989).
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instruction errors, because of their direct effect on the jury, are much more
susceptible to harmless error analysis, and thus courts seem to apply the
standard and attempt analysis on them more often than other types of errors.124
Facially, the “fair assurance/more probable than not” test is less stringent
than the “highly probable” test of harmless error, but is there a practical
difference in how the circuits execute the two tests? Instructive are two cases
about the effect of erroneously admitted evidence of prior convictions on the
jury when the plaintiff’s character is key to his burden of proof.125
In the 2008 Ninth Circuit case Simpson v. Thomas, Simpson filed a civil
claim seeking damages for mistreatment as a prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and claimed that Thomas, a prison guard, used excessive force against him.126
Simpson and Thomas’s testimony understandably differed, and the jury was
essentially asked to find a verdict based on whom they believed was more
truthful.127 Simpson filed a motion in limine to exclude his three prior arrests
and incarcerations, each of which was more than ten years prior to the
incident.128 The trial court denied the motion in limine, and the prior
convictions were admitted.129
On appeal, Simpson argued that the prior convictions impaired his
credibility, prejudicing the jury against him.130 The Ninth Circuit agreed that
the trial court erroneously allowed the prior convictions into evidence and
found that the error was not harmless under the “more probable than not”
test.131 The court paid special attention to the fact that the jury had to choose
between two versions of the same events, making Simpson’s credibility an
essential aspect of trial.132 The jury clearly knew Simpson had committed one
crime because he was in jail, but “the knowledge that he had at least three
other felony convictions likely prejudiced the jury against Simpson and made

124. See, e.g., Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 416, 418 (3d Cir. 1997); Hanna v. Riveland, 87
F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying a harmless error analysis to faulty jury
instructions); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (stating there is a “limited
class” of constitutional errors that defy harmless error analysis, but indicating that most appellate
courts should apply a harmless error analysis).
125. See generally Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding reversible error
where the trial court improperly admitted the plaintiff’s three prior felony convictions because the
outcome of the case depended on the credibility of the witnesses and which witness’s version of
the facts the jury believed); Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding harmless error
in improperly admitting the plaintiff’s prior convictions, despite credibility being a central issue).
126. Simpson, 528 F.3d at 686–87.
127. See id. at 687–88, 691.
128. Id. at 688.
129. Id.
130. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 36, Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2008) (No.
07-16228).
131. Simpson, 528 F.3d at 691.
132. Id.
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them more likely to question his credibility.”133 It is important to note that the
opinion dispensed with the harmless error problem in only a paragraph.134
Thus, the Ninth Circuit found, under their “more probable than not” standard
of review, that the admission of prior convictions in this case was not harmless
error.135
In an analogous 2004 Third Circuit case, Walker v. Horn,136 plaintiffprisoner Walker brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was forcefed by prison officials.137 While imprisoned, Walker began a religious fast that
he planned to continue for as many as fifteen days.138 In response, prison
officials obtained a court order to force-feed him to prevent him from dying.139
They removed him from his cell, restrained his feet, hands, chest, and head,
forced nasogastric tubes into his nose and throat, and force-fed him.140
Walker testified that he told the attending physician, Dr. Lasky, that he was
fasting for religious reasons, but would eat voluntarily to avoid being forcefed.141 Dr. Lasky denied that this occurred.142 At trial, counsel for Dr. Lasky
successfully moved to introduce Walker’s three prior convictions;143 however,
the Third Circuit ruled the admissions as error.144 Walker’s argument, like
Simpson’s above,145 was that his credibility was central to proving his claims
of First and Eighth Amendment violations, because the jury had to evaluate
who to believe.146 According to Walker, “the robbery convictions were central
to Lasky’s efforts to discredit” Walker.147 Further, Walker was the only
witness who testified that he was fasting for religious reasons and that he
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2004).
137. Id. at 324, 326.
138. Id. at 324.
139. Id. at 325.
140. Id. at 326. Walker remained strapped to the table, feeding tubes inserted in his nose and
mouth, for two days. Id. at 326–27.
141. Walker, 385 F.3d at 325–26.
142. Id. at 326.
143. Id. at 332.
144. Id. at 334.
145. See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
146. Walker, 385 F.3d at 334.
147. Id. at 335. Specifically, “Walker contends that [Dr.] Lasky’s counsel told the jury that
they needed to consider Walker’s credibility while deliberating reminding them that Walker had
been ‘convicted of crimes of dishonesty nine times, the robberies.’” Id. Dr. Lasky’s counsel
sought to admit the convictions under FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2), which includes what are known as
crimen falsi, or crimes “the commission of which involves some element of deceit,
untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.” Id. at
332–33.
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offered to eat to avoid being force-fed.148 Because the jury did not find either
of these facts to be true, Walker argued the admission of the previous
convictions prejudiced him by “significantly undermin[ing] his credibility” in
front of the jury.149
The Third Circuit, in a discussion requiring several pages, disregarded
Walker’s argument and adopted Dr. Lasky’s argument—that his counsel’s
reference to Walker’s credibility was “limited,” and that Walker had lied about
being on a religious fast—to determine that the error was harmless.150
Importantly, the court noted that there was inconsistent testimony about certain
collateral facts, namely whether Walker was a vegetarian and enjoyed milk.151
Further, the court also emphasized that the jury had been told that Walker had
been to three prisons in the eight years since the incident, so there was ample
evidence in the record to support that Walker had a substantial criminal
record.152 The Court then found the error to be harmless, and affirmed the
dismissal of Walker’s constitutional claim.153
The Ninth and Third Circuits, facing similar circumstances,154 came to
different results.155 Both Walker and Simpson were the only witnesses
testifying to facts in their favor, had previous convictions to impeach their
credibility admitted erroneously, and relied on their credibility to prove their
claims.156 The Third Circuit, presumably because it faced a higher standard
that it did not feel was met, brushed off Walker’s contentions that Dr. Lasky’s
improper reliance on the convictions eroded Walker’s credibility in front of the
jury.157 Instead, the Third Circuit agreed with Dr. Lasky that a mere “passing
reference” to the robberies could not have affected Walker’s credibility in light
of the other evidence against him.158
The length and particularity of the courts’ analysis also shows a
discrepancy between the tests used.159 The more lenient test allowed the Ninth
Circuit to swiftly (perhaps too swiftly, without the thoughtfulness
148. Id. at 326, 334, 336.
149. Id. at 335.
150. Id. at 334–36.
151. Walker, 385 F.3d at 336.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 336–37.
154. Admittedly, the factual scenario in Walker was more involved because there was more
conflicting testimony between Dr. Lasky and Walker, as well as Walker’s own conflicting
testimony and slightly more evidence against his credibility. See id. at 334–36. However, the
cases raise the same issues in applying to the test of harmless error to the facts. See supra notes
126–53 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 135, 153 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 126–53 and accompanying text.
157. See Walker, 385 F.3d at 335–36.
158. Id. at 336.
159. See supra notes 134, 150 and accompanying text.
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contemplated in Kotteakos) judge the error as being harmless.160 In contrast,
the Third Circuit’s more demanding standard of harmlessness required a more
detailed analysis to ensure that the threshold of harmlessness had not been
reached.161 Thus, the tests used in the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
differ in their application, at least with regard to erroneous admission of prior
convictions.162
II. ANALYSIS OF THE TWO TESTS: WHICH COURT IS CORRECT?
A.

Supreme Court and Commentator Guidance

The determination that the tests used in the two circuits differ in
application next begs the question: Which circuit, if either, has adopted the
correct standard? The question should be framed by the competing values
discussed above.163 On one hand, our justice system places immense
importance on the jury’s role in adjudicating disputes, so courts should be wary
of infringing on their role in any manner.164 This is what led early courts to
reverse a decision with any finding of error, reasoning that an error necessarily
has some effect on the jury, no matter how slight, and that this effect is
unconscionable.165 Further, Chief Justice Traynor points out that the parties to
a lawsuit have a fundamental right to have their disputes settled justly, and
justice cannot be equated with simply reaching the right result;166 “justice” is
fundamental to the process.167
On the other hand, pushing against the role of the jury trial are more
practical considerations of judicial economy and the cost to society of repeat
trials.168 Trials should not be repeated with society bearing the cost when it is
likely that the result will be the same. Whereas fundamental fairness to
litigants is a right to an unprejudiced jury, society’s right to fundamental

160. See Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 2008).
161. See supra notes 150, 154 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 126–53 and accompanying text. One can imagine further evidentiary
hypotheticals, where counsel for the party with the burden of proof relies on some piece of
evidence that was improperly admitted. Depending on the facts of the case, such as the element
to be proved or the existence of other evidence to prove the element, one could see how the error
could reach the region between the activation of the different tests.
163. See supra Introduction and Part I.A.
164. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 8–9, 32–34 and accompanying text.
166. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 17–19.
167. Id. at 17. Chief Justice Traynor also uses a convenient term, which will be adopted for
this discussion, to describe the movement between different tests that lie along the spectrum of
probability: the sliding scale of probabilities. Id. at 33.
168. See Charles F. Campbell, An Economic View of Developments in the Harmless Error
and Exclusionary Rules, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 499, 502, 504 (1990).
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fairness is an efficient resolution of disputes.169 Society, through its current
and future litigants, has an interest in moving cases through the system as
efficiently as possible.170 These litigants also have an interest in predictability
and consistency in preparing for and arguing their grievances.171 A circuit split
is directly contrary to these goals of predictability and consistency. A court
applying the “wrong” test and erroneously remanding trials also hinders this
notion of judicial economy.172
Determining the correct standard must also take into consideration the
difficulty of the task presented. Is it not more proper for the test to be framed
by the principles that govern its rationale, rather than subtle differences in
verbiage, which lead to both different result and different analyses? When
framed by the principles which govern its rationale, the appropriate standard
for judging the harm caused by an error is the point at which, after the dust
settles, the two sides meet.
Guidance from sources of authority for a definitive rule is nebulous at best.
No harmless error statute offers guidance for formulating a standard.173 The
statutes speak in terms of “substantial rights,” but do not attempt to define
those rights, or identify which are “substantial.”174 Two prominent authorities,
Kotteakos and Chief Justice Traynor, disagree in their application.175
Kotteakos suggests the “fair assurance”176 standard, which the Ninth Circuit
equates with the “more probable than not” test, approximating fifty-one
percent certainty.177 In contrast, Chief Justice Traynor is more comfortable
with the “highly probable” test.178 Chief Justice Traynor believes that “[a]ny
169. See id. at 504.
170. Fairfax, supra note 9, at 2061–62 (“Efficiency was a central complaint of those early
twentieth-century reformers sponsoring the adoption of the harmless error rule in America, and
the preservation of strained adjudication resources remains a key rationale for the halting
expansion of the category of structural error.”).
171. See Campbell, supra note 168, at 503.
172. When referencing “society’s costs” later in this Note, these are the “costs” that are
referred to.
173. See supra notes 15–18, 36 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 21811 (2006) (“On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari
in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”); FED. R. EVID. 103(a)
(“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected . . . .”).
175. Compare Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (implementing a “fair
assurance” standard), with TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 35 (advocating for a “highly probable”
test).
176. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. For purposes of this section, the “fair assurance” test will be
treated as it is in the Ninth Circuit as being equivalent to the “more probable than not” test. See
United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir. 1992).
177. See supra notes 23, 63–65 and accompanying text.
178. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 35.
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test less stringent entails too great a risk of affirming a judgment that was
influenced by an error.”179
Admittedly, Kotteakos did not set out to create a definitive standard for
judging harmless error.180 Instead, it attempted to provide suggestions with
which to approach the question, pushing appellate courts to use their judgment
in deciding the error’s effect on a case-by-case basis.181 The Court’s
suggestions in Kotteakos are extensive and extremely helpful, despite not
providing a bright line.182 They follow a discernable theme: temperance in
making a judgment of error.183 The suggestions call for a holistic balancing of
the record, the surrounding circumstances of the error, stare decisis, and what
is at stake upon the outcome.184 Kotteakos stands for the proposition that
justice is a balance in finding a fair result.185 A “fair result” serves the
competing goals discussed above:186 do not deny a litigant his right to an
equitable trial, but do not allow him to escape a result that justice compels.
These adverse goals and the hypothetical nature of the task make determination
of error extremely difficult,187 and trenchant temperance is the weapon against
this difficulty.

179. Id.
180. This can be seen by its suggestion, and subsequent adoption, of several different tests.
See supra note 54.
181. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 761–62.
182. The specific suggestions are not crucial to understanding the basic principle of balance,
but for the sake of understanding and disclosure, they will be listed here. “The general object was
simple: To substitute judgment for automatic application of rules; to preserve review as a check
upon arbitrary action and essential unfairness in trials, but at the same time to make the process
perform that function without giving men fairly convicted [a] multiplicity of loopholes . . . .” Id.
at 759–60; “Do not be technical, where technicality does not really hurt the party whose rights in
the trial and in its outcome the technicality affects.” Id. at 760; “[I]t is not the appellate court’s
function to determine guilt or innocence . . . [n]or . . . to speculate upon probable reconviction and
decide according to how the speculation comes out. Appellate judges cannot escape such
impressions. But they may not make them sole criteria for reversal or affirmance.” Id. at 763.
“But this does not mean that the appellate court can escape altogether taking account of the
outcome. To [do this] . . . would be almost to work in a vacuum.” Id. at 764.
183. See id. at 761–62.
184. Id. at 762.
185. See id. at 764–65.
186. See supra notes 41, 44 and accompanying text.
187. Kotteakos fully recognizes the enormous difficulty associated with the determination:
“[The determination] cannot ever be wholly imprisoned in words, much less upon such a criterion
as what are only technical, what substantial rights [sic]; and what really affects the latter hurtfully.
Judgment, the play of impression and conviction along with intelligence, varies with judges and
also with circumstance. What may be technical for one is substantial for another; what minor and
unimportant in one setting crucial in another.” Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 761.
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Kotteakos recognized this difficulty by compelling courts to “ponder[] all
that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole . . . .”188
“[Courts] must take account of what the error meant to [the jury], not singled
out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that happened.”189 This
simple suggestion flows from the Court’s idea of temperance. Kotteakos’s
suggestions follow a discernable pattern of balancing justice and fairness in
harmless error determination: “do this, but not this;” “an appellate court may
do this, but not every time.”190 This admonition of caution and temperance to
lower courts makes the insidiously difficult judgment of harmfulness of error
fluid and practical. It implicitly promotes the idea that “[a litigant] is entitled
to a fair trial but not a perfect one . . . .”191 By framing the analysis of harmless
error in competing values, the Court concluded that a test balanced in its
application is the best way to judge harmless error.192 This argument is made
even more forceful because Kotteakos was interpreting a command by
Congress: the federal harmless error statute.193
Chief Justice Traynor argues that a test “less stringent [than the “highly
probable” test] entails too great a risk of affirming a judgment that was
influenced by an error.”194 However, this standard is less straightforward than
Kotteakos’s “fair assurance” requirement. The “fair assurance” standard
places the bar of the court’s judgment at more probable than not, an easily
discernable standard of just beyond equipoise (in probability terms, fifty-one
percent).195 In contrast, the “highly probable” test leaves no such assurance of
a discernable bar. This can, and does, lead courts astray in their analysis.196
Walker and Simpson had similar cases to prove.197 Following Kotteakos’s
balancing of ideals, it seems clear that where a litigant’s credibility is central to
proving his case, as it was in both Simpson and Walker in their Section 1983

188. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 764.
190. See id. at 763–65.
191. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973) (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604, 619 (1953)).
192. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765.
193. Id. at 757. The federal harmless error statute, codified in Kotteakos in 28 U.S.C. § 391
(1940), is now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006). See also supra notes 36, 43 and
accompanying text.
194. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 35.
195. Supra note 177 and accompanying text.
196. Compare Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding reversible
error where the trial court improperly admitted the plaintiff’s three prior felony convictions
because the outcome of the case depended on the credibility of the witnesses and which witness’s
version of the facts the jury believed), with Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 334–37 (3d Cir. 2004)
(finding harmless error in improperly admitting the plaintiff’s prior convictions, despite
credibility being a central issue). See also notes 126–53 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 126–53 and accompanying text.
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suits,198 any improper impeachment against this credibility could prejudice the
jury and influence their verdict. The result is suspect because the error went to
a fundamental element of the case.199 The Ninth Circuit quickly came to this
conclusion in Simpson.200
The Third Circuit, however, did not.201 Instead of disposing with this case
using its tempered judgment, the court set about analyzing the evidence against
Walker and accepted Dr. Lasky’s conclusion that any error in admitting the
prior convictions was harmless given the jury’s knowledge that Walker had
been imprisoned before.202 While Kotteakos accepts some consideration of the
evidence,203 the principle determination is the error’s effect on the minds of the
jury.204 In trying to evaluate the prior convictions’ prejudicial effect by its
higher standard, the Third Circuit incorrectly placed heavy importance on the
existence of corroborating impeachment evidence.205 It mistook a higher
standard as requiring a more particularized and in-depth analysis, and came to
an improper conclusion by examining the evidence.206 A higher burden can
compel courts to require more analysis justifying the conclusion. Eliminating
this impractically higher and amorphous burden in exchange for a clearer
standard will help alleviate divergent verdicts such as those in Simpson and
Walker.
The role of the jury trial as a paramount priority for American courts, and
by inference a higher standard to protect it, suggests that the “highly probable”
standard is appropriate. One could argue that the jury’s role is of such
importance that an “almost certainly harmless” test would be more appropriate,
sliding the scale of probability of error to over ninety percent.207 This
argument, however powerful, is weakened by an equally valid point: that
“technical errors” and errors not affecting the substantial rights of parties
should not be reasons to overturn a jury verdict.208 This opposite concern
pushes the sliding scale back into the range of “highly probable.” Chief Justice
Traynor stops his analysis at this point, settling on the “highly probable”

198. See supra notes 126–27, 137 and accompanying text.
199. See Simpson, 528 F.3d at 691; Walker, 385 F.3d at 334.
200. Simpson, 528 F.3d at 691.
201. Walker, 385 F.3d at 336.
202. Id.
203. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
204. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946) (“[Courts] must take account
of what the error meant to [the jury], not singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else
that happened.”).
205. See Walker, 385 F.3d at 334–36.
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 8–9.
208. Indeed, this is what Kotteakos found in interpreting the harmless error statute of the time,
28 U.S.C. § 391 (1940). See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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test.209 What he fails to take into account is another concern competing against
the jury’s role: that a court may mistake a higher standard to require more
analysis, specifically an impermissibly detailed consideration of the
evidence.210
The “fair assurance” test best balances these competing objectives. Justice
Rutledge recognized this feature in Kotteakos as he balanced the competing
dangers of harmless error analysis.211 The discrepancy between Walker and
Simpson shows that confusion of the analysis is a real concern, not one mired
in theory.212 Therefore, the “fair assurance” is the appropriate test to use when
evaluating a trial error’s effect on the jury.
However, this does not end our inquiry into how appellate courts should
analyze error. With cases like Walker and Simpson, what role should the
weight of the evidence play in harmless error analysis?
B.

Suggestion for an Alternative Test

Some harmless error cases include evidence presented in a conclusive
manner; the evidence clearly commands affirmation of the verdict.213 Despite
cautionary language from Kotteakos214 and Chief Justice Traynor’s argument
against weighing the evidence,215 some consideration or weighing of the
evidence should be permitted.
A few of the considerations framing the inquiry into the appropriate test to
judge the harmfulness of an error are semi-translatable into whether an
appellate court can consider the weight of the evidence. Jury protection
becomes a fierce consideration, as an appellate court, in weighing evidence,
steps directly into the fact-finder’s role and conducts a second “quasi-trial.”216
With such a significant emphasis on the right to a jury trial, the litigant’s
concern for fundamental fairness substantially outweighs society’s concern for
efficient resolution of disputes.217 Chief Justice Traynor argues forcefully for

209. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 35.
210. See, e.g., Walker, 385 F.3d at 334–36.
211. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 126–53 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973) (“Upon an independent
examination of the record . . . [t]he testimony erroneously admitted was merely cumulative of
other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the jury. . . . We reject
the notion that a Bruton error can never be harmless.”); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,
254 (1969) (“[T]he case against Harrington was so overwhelming that we conclude that this
[error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”).
214. “The crucial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not
on one’s own, in the total setting.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
215. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 28.
216. Id. at 21.
217. Id. at 19.
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an appellant’s right to a fair trial.218 In his view, “[a]n appellant whose right to
a fair trial in a trial court has been vitiated should be accorded that right
anew.”219 However, the concern for the jury’s province and a litigant’s right to
a fair trial cannot totally erase society’s right to the same. Therefore, some
consideration of the evidence, even if based on a scintilla of society’s right to
fundamental fairness, is warranted.220
Chief Justice Traynor provides an interesting but perhaps foolhardy
response to Kotteakos’s recognition of the difficulty in judging error at the trial
court level: try harder. 221 However, a deficiency of will or failure to inquire
properly is not always the problem plaguing a misapplying appellate judge.
Walker is instructive.222 Instead of Walker having three prior convictions
entered in against him and labeled as crimen falsi, while the jury knows he has
stayed at two separate federal penitentiaries, let us adjust the evidence slightly.
Assume the more balanced factual scenario in which the jury has been told,
through Walker’s own testimony, that he has stayed at five different federal
penitentiaries, presumably for five different federal offenses, and that, as in the
actual case, three prior convictions for robbery were erroneously admitted. In
such a case, how could the Third Circuit determine that the erroneous
admission of the convictions was harmless without weighing the effect of the
five imprisonments? Or, put another way, if the Ninth Circuit had heard this
case and quickly judged the error to be harmful because the prior convictions
affected Walker’s credibility, how could it ignore the effect of the five
imprisonments on the jury?
These considerations lead to a proposal of a hybrid, two part test.223 First,
an appellate court should make every effort to discern whether an error is
harmless under the Ninth Circuit’s “fair assurance” or “more probable than
not” standard, taking care to stick to Kotteakos and Chief Justice Traynor’s
principles of considering the effect on the jury without weighing the evidence

218. Id. at 20.
219. Id. at 22.
220. The Supreme Court and other appellate courts seem to acknowledge this and take some
consideration of the weight of the evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., Int’l Mktg., Inc. v.
Counteract Balancing Beads, Inc., 48 Fed. Appx. 372, 375 (3d Cir. 2002) (“We need not decide
whether this was error, because even if the Court erred, given the other evidence in the case, the
error was harmless.”); supra notes 191, 213. However, some courts have refused to enter into
this deliberation. See, e.g., Arnold v. Runnels, 421 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The question
posed for us by [the Kotteakos] standard is not whether the evidence was sufficient or whether the
jury would have decided the same way even in the absence of the error. The question is whether
the error influenced the jury.”).
221. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 29–30.
222. See supra notes 136–53 and accompanying text.
223. This test resembles one examined but rejected by Gregory Mitchell. Mitchell, supra
note 27, at 1345–46, 1368.
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presented.224 If the Court determines the error is harmless, its analysis is
complete and the verdict stands. If, however, it cannot find, with fair
assurance, that the error is harmless, or that the error is such that a
determination of its effect on the jury is speculative or will not yield to rational
analysis, it continues to the second part of the test. If the evidence is so
overwhelming, total, or uncontradicted such that a repeat trial will almost
certainly yield the same verdict, then the error can be said to be harmless and
the verdict affirmed. This should be true except when the magnitude of the
non-constitutional error is such that the interests of justice or deterrence of
prominent, common, or significantly undesirable errors at the trial level pray
for a retrial.
This lengthy test best preserves all of the competing values of fundamental
fairness and practical concerns for efficiency and validity.225 By making every
effort to find an error harmless without considering the evidence, the court has
done what it can to prevent infringing on the jury’s province. It is compelled
to do so with all of the guidelines Kotteakos has delineated.226 By giving
preference to this prong of the test, this harmless error analysis also gives
deference to the jury’s role in disputes. Subordinate to this concern is society’s
right to an efficient resolution of claims, embodied in the power of appellate
courts to ignore the error in the face of evidence that is not just overwhelming,
but total or uncontradicted. This idea acts as an extension of the harmless error
statutes by not allowing reversal unless an error affects a substantial right of a
party.227 An error cannot be said to affect a substantial right in the face of
overwhelming, total, or uncontradicted evidence, such that a repeat trial will
almost certainly yield the same verdict.
The test, while infringing on the verdict by second-guessing the jury’s
determination, has such a high standard that near certainty is required. This
certainty helps alleviate any concerns of invading on the jury’s province.
Furthermore, Kotteakos does not completely bar consideration of the evidence
in evaluating error.228 It permits an inclusion of the weight of evidence in
analysis, but urges temperance.229 Such a high standard is in accord with this
temperance.

224. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 763–64 (“[T]he question is, not were they right in their
judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what effect the error
had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury’s decision.”); TRAYNOR, supra note 1,
at 28 (“[T]he crucial question is not whether there is substantial evidence to support the judgment,
but whether error affected the judgment.”).
225. See supra notes 164–72 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 180–92 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 16–18, 20 and accompanying text.
228. Supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
229. “[I]t is not the appellate court’s function to determine guilt or innocence. Nor is it to
speculate upon probable reconviction and decide according to how the speculation comes out.
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Additionally, after weighing the evidence to decide if it reaches the high
burden, courts have the authority to guard against abusive errors in their
circuits. Thus, they may decide that an error is so undesirable or has become
so common in practice that reversal is warranted to dissuade repetition in the
future.230 For example, if errors in admitting prior convictions in section 1983
suits become too numerous or prominent, the appellate court could simply
categorically reverse the judgment after finding error, signaling to trial courts
that they are not resolving these questions correctly.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, situations such as the hypothetical
based on Walker,231 as well as Walker itself,232 are more clearly and reliably
analyzed. First, when placed in the uncomfortable position of evaluating an
error that is not immediately subject to harmless error analysis, using
exclusively the “effect on the jury” test, appellate courts may make the
determination with little weighing of the evidence, using the first prong of the
test; they may then move on to a consideration of the evidence according to the
standard, with their minds at ease. Thus, when courts are compelled, due to
the evidence in the record or the nature of the error, to consider the evidence in
some fashion, as the Third Circuit seemed to be in Walker,233 they may do so
by utilizing this uniform, tempered logic.
The test will ensure that splits like those in Simpson and Walker will not
continue. If the test described above had been used in both cases, they would
have come out the same way. Given that Walker had more evidence against
him than Simpson,234 the Third Circuit presumably felt compelled to consider
the evidence more so than the Ninth Circuit. The test described above allows it
do so in a manner consistent with its sister circuits. The Ninth Circuit would
have had an equally easy time with this test as it did with its own. Had the
Third Circuit considered only the prejudicial effect of the evidence and the fact
that Walker’s credibility was central to his case (as in Simpson), and not
weighed the evidence as it did, it would most likely have found the admissions
harmful under the “fair assurance” test. However, it then would have had the
occasion to weigh the evidence using the “overwhelming, total, or
uncontradicted, such that a repeat trial will almost certainly yield the same

Appellate judges cannot escape such impressions. But they may not make them sole criteria for
reversal or affirmance.” Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 763 (internal citations omitted).
230. This was a concern of Chief Justice Traynor’s when finding evidence to be
overwhelming, despite the existence of error. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 22–23. He reasoned
that the deterrent effect of such errors will be lost if they are found to be harmless because of
overwhelming evidence. Id. Appellate judges’ power to manage the errors committed in their
circuit eases this concern.
231. See supra text following note 222.
232. See supra notes 136–53 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 136–53 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 126–53 and accompanying text.
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verdict” test. Reasonable contemplation would then say that knowledge of two
imprisonments, as well as other inconsistent impeachment testimony, is not
“overwhelming, total, or uncontradicted” in a way that shows Walker was not
telling the truth about the incident.235
Thus, the lengthy test described above will solve several of the problems
plaguing the current harmless error framework, as well as balance the
competing concerns that define the doctrine.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to imagine a legal doctrine as important to issues of
fundamental fairness as the analysis of harmless error. It is a headline
conundrum, bounded on each end by a litigant’s and society’s right to
fundamentally fair and efficient resolution of disputes. The question is not
specific to criminal or civil litigation, as both types of litigants are equally
deserving of this fundamental fairness. The complexity and difficulty in
balancing these principles has led to sparse authority from the Supreme Court
for the standard used to judge the harm caused by a trial error. This lack of
definitive authority, in turn, has caused conflict between the tests used by the
Third and Ninth Circuits (as well as others) in both verbiage and their practical
consequences.236 Evaluating the principles that guide our justice system will
help in choosing which test to use.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos, approached the
problem in just this way. It acknowledged the challenge of harmless error
analysis, and sought to balance the principles of fundamental fairness and
efficiency by advocating sound, rational judgment and temperance in
considering an error’s harm.237 The results of this precarious balancing act
necessitate a median standard, one that is clearly delineated and lies between
the competing objectives. The danger of coming to any other conclusion is
confusion among the courts in applying a higher standard. As in Walker, a
court may mistake a higher standard as demanding a more thorough analysis of
the evidence presented.238 Under Kotteakos, this concern is relevant, but
cannot be the only, or indeed the most important factor in reaching a
conclusion.239 With these concerns in mind, the appropriate test is whether an

235. This raises the interesting question of whether impeachment testimony, given its position
as non-substantive evidence, can ever be so “overwhelming, total, or contradicted” such that the
test can be satisfied.
236. See supra Part I.D.
237. See supra notes 46–72 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text.
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appellate court can say, with fair assurance240 that an error has not contributed
to the jury’s verdict.
With the concerns of fundamental fairness to society and future litigants
factoring into a proper harmless error analysis, some consideration of the
evidence is warranted to ensure that clearly correct verdicts are not retried.
This causes confusion among future litigants and hinders judicial economy.
Thus, some modification of the traditional test is in order. First, an appellate
court will use the “fair assurance” test to determine whether an error is
harmless. If the error is harmless, the analysis is complete. However, if the
court finds that the error is harmful, it moves on to the second element of the
test. There, an appellate court affirms a verdict, despite error, if the evidence is
so overwhelming, total, or uncontradicted that a repeat trial will almost
certainly yield the same verdict. There is, however, an exception: if the nonconstitutional error is such that the interests of justice and fundamental fairness
or deterrence of prominent, common, or significantly undesirable errors at the
trial level pray for a remand of the case. This test puts to rest the ambiguity
caused by the Supreme Court’s silence, and resolves the confusion among the
federal circuits as to how to analyze the harmfulness of trial error. In the end,
appellate courts must be guided by the principles that have shaped our justice
system. Yet they must, in reviewing trial error, specifically recall the most
understated (and admittedly cynical) of these: “‘[A] defendant is entitled to a
fair trial but not a perfect one,’ for there are no perfect trials.”241
DAVID A. SHIELDS*

240. Put another way, an appellate court can affirm if it is “more probable than not” that the
error was harmless.
241. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1973) (quoting Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)).
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